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TERMINATION OF TREATIES BY THE EXECUTIVE
WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL: THE
CASE OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
BY JOHN H. RIGGS, JR.t
I. INTRODUCTIONO N 15 NOVEMBER 1965, the United States Department of State
delivered a diplomatic note to the Polish Government in Warsaw
announcing the withdrawal of the United States from the Warsaw Con-
vention.' The note and accompanying press release ' indicated that the
denunciation resulted solely from the Convention's low limitations on
liability for injury or death to passengers, and in no way represented a
departure from the long-standing commitment of the United States to
international co-operation in matters relating to civil aviation. It further
disclosed that the withdrawal, which by the terms of Article 39 of the
Convention would not take effect until six months after delivery of the
notice of denunciation,3 would be rescinded if
prior to its effective date of May 15, 1966, there is a reasonable prospect of
an international agreement on limits of liability in international air trans-
portation in the area of $100,000 per passenger or on uniform rules but
without any limit of liability, and if, pending the effectiveness of such
international agreement, there is a provisional arrangement among the prin-
cipal international airlines waiving the limits of liability up to $75,000 per
passenger.4
At the time of the denunciation, neither the Congress nor the Senate by
t B.A., Yale University; LL.B., University of Virginia. Member of the New York Bar.
'Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air (Warsaw Convention), 12 Oct. 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934) [hereinafter War-
saw Convention]. Although not an original signatory to the Warsaw Convention when it was nego-
tiated in 1929, the United States adhered to the treaty on 29 October 1934. The Senate advised
adherence, subject to the reservation under the "Additional Protocol," on 15 June 1934, and the
President duly proclaimed the adherence on 29 October 1934. The United States signed, but has
never ratified The Hague Protocol which modifies the Warsaw Convention, and which took effect
for the ratifying countries on 1 August 1963.
'The Department of State's note is reprinted in 31 J. AlR L. & COM. 305 (1965), 53 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 924 (1965). The press release, dated 15 November 1965, is set forth in 53 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 923 (1965). See generally Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention,
31 J. AI L. & COM. 291 (1965).
' Warsaw Convention, art. 39:
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this convention by a
notification addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall
at once inform the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification of denunciation,
and shall operate only as regards the party which shall have proceeded to de-
nunciation.
4Dep't of State Press Release No. 268, 15 Nov. 1965; 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923, 924 (1965).
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itself had taken formal action to concur in or to advise the withdrawal of
the United States from the Convention.!
Just one day prior to the effective date, the Department of State an-
nounced the withdrawal of its denunciation of the Warsaw Convention.
Essentially, the withdrawal of the denunciation resulted from an eleventh
hour agreement among the world's leading international air carriers to
waive the $8300 personal injury and death damages limitation as well as
certain defenses under the Convention, in exchange for a tariff provision
setting a new damages limit of $75,000 under conditions of virtual absolute
liability." But in cancelling its denunciation, the Department of State made
it clear that the agreement by the carriers was only a "provisional" mea-
sure and that, "the Government of the United States looks forward to
continued discussions looking to an up-to-date and permanent interna-
tional agreement on the important issues dealt with in the Warsaw Con-
vention."7 Thus, the State Department may again denounce the Warsaw
Convention if it does not feel that steps are being taken with deliberate
speed to negotiate a multilateral replacement treaty for the Warsaw-
Hague combination.
The possibility of a later denunciation raises the question of presidential
power to unilaterally withdraw or terminate United States adherence to
a self-executing treaty of the nature of the Warsaw Convention.! The
Constitution provides that the President "shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-
thirds of the Senators present concur. . . ."' However, the Constitution is
silent on the question of where the treaty-terminating power lies. It would
seem logical that the same formalities required for making a treaty would
prevail in the termination of a bilateral one or in the withdrawal from
a multilateral one."0
The only action taken by Congress or the Senate alone was a hearing by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on 26-27 May 1965, on the question of ratification of The Hague Protocol to
the Warsaw Convention. In the Committee's report dated 29 June 1965, ratification of The Hague
Protocol was recommended; but the Committee added that if legislation containing a comple-
mentary insurance program "is not enacted within a reasonable time (i.e., prior to the adjournment
of the 89th Congress), the Department of State should take immediate steps to denounce the War-
saw Convention and The Hague Protocol." 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 244 (1966). No formal action
has been taken by the Congress or the Senate since then. However, a resolution sponsored by twenty-
eight senators directing the President to denounce the Warsaw Convention was introduced on
3 May 1965, and is currently pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (S. Res. 256,
89th Cong.).
5 4 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1033 (1966). The text of the United States note to the Polish Gov-
ernment dated 14 May 1966, and the press releases of the Department of State on the withdrawal
of the denunciation are set forth in 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 243-48 (1966). Three domestic airlines,
Delta, National, and United, have not accepted the absolute liability provision.
Department of State Note to Polish Government, 14 May 1966, reprinted in 32 J. AIR L. &
COM. 248 (1966).
'See generally CoRwIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 423-25
(1953); 5 HACRWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 319-42 (1943); 2 HYDE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 1516-27 (2d ed.
1945); Nelson, The Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States: The-
ory and Practice, 42 MINN. L. REV. 879 (1958); and Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the
President in International Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CALIF. L. REv.
643 (1937).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
'°"[T]he obligations of the treaty could not be changed or varied, but by the same formalities
with which they were introduced; or, at least, by some act of as high an import, and of as un-
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Yet there is no judicial decision in American jurisprudence which has
directly met this question. Perhaps one reason for the absence of case law
on the subject is that relatively few treaties are legislative and self-
executing in nature, and very few of such treaties have been terminated
by the executive branch alone. Most treaties are in the nature of inter-
national compacts which relate to governmental relations only. Only a
small number are conventions which establish both an international and,
in the case of the United States,"1 an internal (legislative) body of law
governing rights between private individuals or companies. Thus, few
instances occur where private persons have the opportunity to litigate the
issue of whether private rights, established by a treaty, have been un-
constitutionally abrogated by the improper termination of a treaty by the
Executive alone. Because of the problem of "standing," it is doubtful
that an individual could litigate this issue unless the treaty in question
involved private rights and the termination affected him directly. But if
the Department of State again denounces the Warsaw Convention and
allows the denunciation to become effective six months afterwards, a
strong possibility exists that this issue might be litigated because of the
Convention's direct effect on both individuals and companies.
The question of the power of the executive branch to terminate a legis-
lative treaty without the concurrence of all or part of the legislative branch
is a matter of municipal law, not international law. The internal enforce-
ability of a treaty as "the Supreme Law of the Land" after an attempted
unilateral termination by the President depends entirely upon American
constitutional law."s
II. TERMINATION POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE
The position of the executive branch on this question has been incon-
sistent. In a memorandum relating to the termination of a bilateral treaty
of commerce and navigation with Italy, Green H. Hackworth, then Legal
Adviser of the Department of State, wrote to President Roosevelt:
The question as to the authority of the Executive to terminate treaties
independently of the Congress or of the Senate is in a somewhat confused
state. Although the Constitution contains provision with reference to the
making of treaties, it is silent with respect to their abrogation. In some cases
treaties have been terminated by the President pursuant to action by Con-
gress. In other cases action has been taken by the President pursuant to
resolutions of the Senate alone. In still others the initiative has been taken
equivocal an authority." The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 75 (1821) (Story, J.);
Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 243, 128 N.E. 185, 192 (Cardozo, J.), cert. denied, 254 U.S.
643 (1920); cf. Jones v. Walker, 13 Fed. Cas. 1059, 1062-63 (No. 7507) (C.C. Va., date un-
known) (Jay, C.J.).
"U.S. CONST. art. VI, S 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges of every
State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the contrary notwithstanding.
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924);
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
" Riesenfeld, supra note 8, at 656-58.
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by the President. In some cases his action was afterwards notified to the
Senate or to both Houses of Congress and approved, in other cases it was
not referred to either House. No settled rule or procedure has been followed."'
Since the question has never been directly considered by an American
court,14 the opinions of constitutional law authorities are split. Hackworth
apparently considered the answer to lie in presidential precedents, not in
constitutional law."5 It has also been argued that the silence of the Consti-
tution on this point probably means that the President acting alone has
the power to terminate a treaty as an international obligation, although
perhaps not as binding municipal law.' Others argue that "the abrogation
of a treaty involves the exercise of the same kind of power as the making
of it,"" and that therefore some sort of congressional or senatorial con-
currence in termination is necessary for it to have both international and
internal effect."8
Little judicial authority exists. In Techt v. Hughes,"' Judge Cardozo
considered the effect of the first World War upon private rights created
by a pre-war treaty between the United States and Austria-Hungary.
After repeating the well-established rule that courts alone may not in-
validate a treaty provision without some action taken by "the political de-
partments of the government that it has been suspended or annulled,""°
Judge Cardozo stated, in dicta:
President and Senate may denounce the treaty, and thus terminate its life.
Congress may enact an inconsistent rule, which will control the action of
the courts. . . . The treaty of peace itself may set up new relations, and
terminate earlier pacts, either tacitly or expressly. . . . But until one of
these things is done, until some one of these events occurs, while war is still
flagrant, and the will of the political departments of the government un-
'3 5 HAClWORTH, Op. cit. supra note 8, at 330. Mr. Hackworth nevertheless advised President
Roosevelt that he had the power to terminate the Italian Treaty without seeking the advice and
consent of the Senate or the approval of Congress because of an 1898 precedent involving unilateral
termination of a clause in a similar treaty with Switzerland. President Roosevelt thereafter gave
notice to the Italian Government of the termination of the treaty, and no action by the Senate or
Congress was sought. A similar treaty termination without legislative participation occurred in 1926
during President Coolidge's administration. But Presidents Wilson and Hayes took the position that
the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate was required before they could give notice of
termination. In President Wilson's case, withdrawal from a unilateral public health treaty was in-
volved. Reeves, The Jones Act and the Denunciation of Treaties, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 33 (1921).
President Taft obtained a joint resolution of both houses of Congress in 1911 ratifying prior notice
given by him that the United States was terminating a commercial treaty with Russia. Other pro-
cedures have also been followed. These and other instances are described and catalogued in 5 HACK-
WORTH, Op. cit. supra note 8, at 319-33; Nelson, supra note 8, at 879-82.
"' The question of whether American courts would accept jurisdiction over this issue is discussed
inlra.
Is Cf. note 17 infra; CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 423-24.
16 1 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 584-85 (2d ed. 1929).
" Taft, The Boundaries Between the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches of the
Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599, 610 (1916).
s Riesenfeld, supra note 8, at 660-62.
'9229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185, cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920).
0 In Jones v. Walker, 13 Fed. Cas. 1059, 1063 (No. 7507) (C.C. Va., date unknown), Chief
Justice Jay stated, "Where the department authorized to annul a voidable treaty shall deem it most
conducive to the national interest that it should longer continue to be obeyed and observed, no
right can be incident to the judiciary to declare it void in a single instance." See also Charlton v.
Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902). On the issue of the effect
of war upon treaties, see Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Society for the Propagation of the
Gospel v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 494-95 (1823); Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258,
262-63 (6th Cir. 1957) (Stewart, C.J.); and 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 617 (1958).
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revealed, the courts, as I view their function, play a humbler and more
cautious part."
This language has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court,
albeit again in dicta.'
In Van Der Weyde v. Ocean Transp. Co.,' Congress terminated a treaty
by means of a statute and "requested and directed" the President to give
notice of the termination to Norway. Despite the unusual procedure, the
Supreme Court decided that the treaty had been properly terminated since
both political departments had concurred in the termination. Thus, where
the President and the Congress are in harmony on the termination, the
court will consider such action as proper." But direct confrontation on the
issue of the President's power to terminate a treaty without some form of
congressional approbation was avoided:
[W]e think that the question as to the authority of the Executive in the
absence of congressional action, or of action by the treaty-making power,
to denounce a treaty of the United States, is not here involved.'
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.," the Supreme Court
dealt with the power of the President as the "sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations." Congress had passed
a joint resolution empowering the President to prohibit the sale of arms
or munitions into certain Latin American countries. The President there-
after issued proclamations putting the resolution into effect. The consti-
tutionality of this procedure was in issue. With sweeping language, Mr.
Justice Sutherland broadly defined the presidential power in foreign re-
lations:
Not only, as we have shown, is the Federal power over external affairs in
origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but
participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast
external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold prob-
lems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative
of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate;
but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot in-
trude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it."
Whether this general language could be used to support the proposition
that the President may terminate a treaty alone is doubtful. Not all
treaties involve merely political relationships with foreign nations. Chief
Justice Marshall has said:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, conse-
quently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
"' 229 N.Y. at 243, 128 N.E. at 192.
"Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 509 (1947). See also Mr. Justice Story's language quoted in
The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1821).
"297 U.S. 114 (1936). See the thorough discussion of the case in Riesenfeld, supra note 8, at
645-65; and Comment, 35 MIcH. L. REV. 88 (1936).
"Riesenfeld, supra note 8, at 665.
"3 297 U.S. at 117.
2e299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
27 Id. at 319.
[Vol. 32
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legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative
provision."0
If a particular treaty is fundamentally legislation on an international
plane, as in the case of the Warsaw Convention, and if it relates princi-
pally to private rights and liabilities, the analogy presents itself between
repeal of a statute and termination of a treaty legislative in nature. The
power to repeal is inherent in the power to legislate, and it would seem
that the same formalities would be necessary in both enactment and repeal.
Since a treaty cannot become effective either as an international compact
or as internal law in the United States until two-thirds of the Senate
consent, then can it be terminated internationally or internally without
action by the Senate or Congress?
Congress has considerable power to modify or to abrogate treaties.
Congress by legislation, and so far as the people and authorities of the United
States are concerned, could abrogate a treaty made between this country and
another country which had been negotiated by the President and approved
by the Senate."'
In Taylor v. Morton, ° Mr. Justice Curtis wrote this illuminating discussion
of the power of Congress to abrogate a treaty by inconsistent legislation:
The first and most obvious distinction between a treaty and an act of con-
gress is, that the former is made by the president and ratified by two thirds
of the senators present; the latter by majorities of both houses of Congress
and the president, or by both houses only, by constitutional majorities, if
the president refuses his assent. Ordinarily, it is certainly true, that the powers
of enacting and repealing laws reside in the same persons. But there is no
reason, in the nature of things, why it may not be otherwise. . . . I think
it is impossible to maintain that, under our constitution, the president and
senate exclusively, possess the power to modify or repeal a law found in a
treaty.
1
Curtis reasoned that the Constitution could not have been intended to
render this country "helpless" by requiring the President and Senate to
enter into a new treaty with the other country, requiring the latter's ap-
proval, before the present treaty could be terminated. Since both treaty and
congressional legislation are on equal footing as the supreme law of the
land, subsequent legislation can cause an inconsistent treaty to be abro-
gated. As in Van Der Weyde v. Ocean Tramp. Co.," the rule in this line
of cases accords with Mr. Justice Story's precept that treaty termination
should be only "by some act of as high an import, and of as unequivocal
an authority" as the formalities by which a treaty was made.3
But the influence of the executive branch on the courts in treaty matters
2'Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). See note 11 supra; Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258 (1890) (extent of the treaty-making power). Marshall's statement has been repeated
often. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 747 (1838); United States v. Arre-
dondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 735 (1832).
19La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 460 (1899). See also The Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600-01 (1889); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 597 (1884);
The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870).
3023 Fed. Cas. 784 (No. 13799) (C.C.D. Mass. 185).
'lid. at 785-86.
'2297 U.S. 114 (1936).
"'The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 75 (1821).
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is considerable. Whether a treaty continues to exist or has been extinguished
is principally a matter for executive determination. Thus, the decision as
to whether a treaty remains in effect despite a war between the two na-
tions" and whether a treaty has been terminated by the breach of the
other country is for the Executive alone to answer."' In Charlton v. Kelly,'
the Department of State had advised the Court that it considered the
United States still bound by an extradition treaty with Italy, although
Italy had apparently violated the treaty on several occasions. The Supreme
Court stated, "A construction of a treaty by the political department of
the Government, while not conclusive upon a court called upon to con-
strue such a treaty in a matter involving personal rights, is nevertheless
of much weight.""7 It can be argued that the Court's recognition of the
views of the executive branch on the effectiveness or interpretation of a
treaty is a reflection of the judiciary's deference to the President in matters
relating more to the conduct of foreign relations than to the making of
treaties. Although, in some instances, the power to interpret a treaty may
be the power to terminate it, the two powers remain fundamentally differ-
ent in most cases.
It has been suggested that there is a controlling analogy between the
President's power of removal from office and the power to terminate
treaties.. In the same section which grants the treaty-making power to
the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Con-
stitution gives the President the power to appoint all officers of the United
States not otherwise provided for, again "by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate. . . ."" At first glance, there would seem to be a
clear parallel between the two provisions due to their proximity in the
Constitution and their common language.
In Parsons v. United States,"' the Supreme Court held that the President
could remove a federal district attorney from his office before the end of
his term without congressional or senatorial approval even though a
statute provided for a four-year tenure of office. Later, in Myers v. United
States,"' the Court considered the power of the President to unilaterally
"Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 514 (1947); Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185,
cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920). President has on one occasion invoked the rule of rebus sic
stantibus (a treaty shall cease to be obligatory as soon as the state of facts and conditions upon
which it was founded has substantially changed) in justification for suspending United States obli-
gations under the International Loadline Convention of 5 July 1930, 47 Star. 2228, T.S. No. 858
(1931). The presidential proclamation was based on an opinion of the Attorney General, 40 Oss.
Arr'Y GEN. 119 (1941). See Briggs, The Attorney General Invokes Rebus Sic Stantibus, 36 AM.
J. INT'L L. 89 (1942). 2 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1527.
3 5 Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); cf. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 285 (1902).
ae229 U.S. 447 (1913).
7 Id. at 468. In nontreaty matters involving the exercise by the Executive of its power to con-
duct the foreign relations of the United States, the influence of the Department of State's opinion is
similarly persuasive on the courts. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964);
58 AM. J. INT'L L. 779 (1964). But see, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Comment, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 899 (1965). Cf. Latvian State Cargo & Passenger
S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1951); The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1944).
38 Nelson, supra note 8, at 883-88.
"U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
40 167 U.S. 324 (1897).
4' 272 U.S. 12 (1926).
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remove a postmaster. A statute passed by Congress providing that the
postmaster could be removed from office by the President only with the
advice and consent of the Senate was held an unconstitutional limitation
on the removal power of the President. The pronouncement in Myers was
narrowed considerably in Humphrey's Executor v. United States,"a where
it was held that the President could not unilaterally remove officers ap-
pointed pursuant to an act of Congress to an office of legislative or judicial
nature. Thus, the Myers decision affirming the power of the President
alone to remove was confined to purely executive officers.
It has been argued that the powers of termination and removal are both
essentially negative, that the Constitution does not expressly limit either
power, and that the President is in both cases best suited to determine
whether a treaty should remain in effect or whether a person should re-
main in office." But, as previously pointed out, treaties are often funda-
mentally legislative; they can, like the Warsaw Convention, provide a
set of international rules governing rights and liabilities between private
persons. Termination of a legislative treaty is by no means essentially a
negative act. Treaties, together with the Constitution and federal legisla-
tion, are at the top of the hierarchy of statutes establishing American law.
Terminating a treaty of this sort automatically causes the applicable law in
most cases to become that of the various states." In any case, some substi-
tute local law moves in immediately to fill the void. The decision to termi-
nate a legislative treaty, involving as it does the exchange of one body of
law for another, is principally for the legislature, although the interests of
the Executive in the conduct of foreign relations may be indirectly in-
volved." The issue remains, however, whether in some cases the President
is, after all, best suited to decide on treaty termination in an area tradi-
tionally and constitutionally governed by legislation.
A serious practical hurdle to the adjudication of the President's power
to terminate a treaty is the "political question" doctrine. It is settled that
"the question whether a state is in a position to perform its treaty obli-
gations,"" whether a foreign country had properly ratified a treaty with
the United States,"7 whether the United States is justified in disregarding
its treaty engagements with other nations,"' and whether a treaty remains
effective after a foreign country, which is the other party to the compact,
42291 U.S. 602 (1935).
43 Nelson, supra note 8, at 887-88.
"4Cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941).
4 It should be noted that in the Warsaw Convention situation, what is involved is mostly the
regulation of foreign commerce, which duty devolves upon the Congress (U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8),
although foreign relations are peripherally involved. Perhaps, therefore, Congress should necessarily
play some part in the question of whether the resolution of the problems with which the Conven-
tion deals should revert to local law instead of the present treaty.
"'Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 514 (1947). The Court found that the conduct of the "politi-
cal departments" was wholly consistent with the continued validity of a treaty, despite an inter-
vening war.
"Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 656 (1853); Kelley v. Societe Anonyme Beige
d'Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne, 242 F. Supp. 129, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
"The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889),
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is merged into another country"9 are all non-justiciable political questions50
It seems doubtful, however, that the "political question" doctrine applies
to the issue of who can terminate a treaty under American constitutional
law. 1 The present activist Supreme Court has recently indicated a greater
willingness to accept jurisdiction over cases which formerly involved
"political questions." 2 Moreover, in cases which more closely approach
the treaty termination question, the Supreme Court by analogy has indi-
cated that the political question doctrine would not be invoked. The power
of the Congress to force the abrogation of a treaty,"s the congressional pow-
er to abrogate a treaty by subsequent inconsistent legislation," the power of
the president to enter into a binding "executive agreement" without Con-
gressional assent,"5 and the Executive's power to unilaterally regulate
foreign commerce" have all been judicially dealt with. It would seem
logical, therefore, that the Supreme Court would not refuse to review the
constitutional question of the power to terminate treaties. The areas where
the court has refused review under the "political question" doctrine relate
generally to issues governed by international rather than municipal law,
and to subjects which come directly within the President's power to
conduct foreign relations.
III. CONCLUSION
Although there is no determinative answer yet to the question of the
President's power to terminate a treaty without some form of congres-
sional approval, the issue appears to be justiciable. In the case of the War-
saw Convention, the President must deal with a treaty which is legislative
in nature and which is principally concerned with the regulation of foreign
commerce. For these reasons, the courts should require some congressional
approval before that treaty could be validly terminated as part of the
supreme law of the land. In this connection, development of a judicial
doctrine similar to that announced in the power of removal cases is con-
ceivable, whereby the power to terminate would depend upon the nature
and subject matter of the treaty.
4'Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902).
°In Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cas. 784, 787 (No. 13799) (C.C.D. Mass. 1855), Mr. Justice
Curtis asked:
Is it a judicial question, whether a treaty with a foreign sovereign has been violated
by him; whether the consideration of a particular stipulation in a treaty, has been
voluntarily withdrawn by one party, so that it is no longer obligatory on the other;
whether the views and acts of a foreign sovereign, manifested through his representa-
tive have given just occasion to the political departments of our government to with-
hold the execution of a promise contained in a treaty, or to act in direct contravention
of such promise? I apprehend not. These powers have not been confided by the people
to the judiciary, which has no suitable means to exercise them; but to the executive
and the legislative departments of our government. They belong to diplomacy and
legislation, and not to the administration of existing laws.
" Contra, CORWiN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 426.2 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). There the Supreme Court stated in dicta,
"[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance." See generally Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Func-
tional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 542 (1966).
"Van Der Weyde v. Ocean Transp. Co., 297 U.S. 114 (1936).
"See cases cited note 29 supra.
" United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
"United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 660 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
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